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EVIDENCE
ROBERT

G. SPECTOR*

In July 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect. This
culminated a ten year effort of the United States Supreme Court and both
houses of Congress to produce such rules. Although this was a long and
thorough process, gaps inevitably remain. Furthermore, there are areas in
which the ultimate test, standard, or rule must be determined by constitutional
principles, by the interaction of the Constitution and the new rules. This
interaction may require close examination of the exact nature of certain types
of evidence and privileges in order to ensure that constitutional protections are
maintained and that the general tendency of the new rules to liberalize the
admission of evidence and encourage the presentation of trustworthy evidence to the trier of fact is furthered.
During the 1975-1976 term, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
decided several cases which involved evidentiary problems. One of these
cases clearly demonstrates the close examination of the nature of certain
evidence required by interaction with the Constitution. Two others demonstrate the process of filling gaps in the new rules by leaving to the discretion of
the trial judge matters which may formerly have been subject to more limited
rules.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

In In re January 1976 Grand Jury, I the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered for the first time the relationship between the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination 2 and the attorney-client
privilege.3 In Genson, two people were suspected of robbing a federally
insured savings and loan. The government's investigation revealed that one of
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University College of Law; member of the
Wisconsin Bar; J.D., University of Wisconsin.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Jay Price, third-year law student at Loyola
University College of Law, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter referred to in the text as Genson].
2. The fifth amendment, in pertinent part, reads as follows: "No person . . . shall be
... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
3. The other circuits are split upon this question. See, e.g., United States v. Kasmir, 499
F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974) (attorney does have standing to assert the privilege for the client);
Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) (attorney does not have standing to raise
the privilege on behalf of the client)
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the two suspects had been employed by Genson, an attorney, and that both
suspects had visited Genson within three hours after the robbery. In addition,
one suspect had transferred $200 cash to one of Genson's associates. The
government informed Genson that the money he had received from the
suspect might be proceeds of the robbery but Genson refused to answer any
questions concerning the case on the basis of the attorney-client privilege.
One week later Genson was served with a subpoena duces tecum
requesting production of any money paid to him by the suspects after the time
the robbery was committed.4 Genson's motion to quash the subpoena was
denied and he was ordered to appear before the grand jury and to comply with
the subpoena. Genson appeared but refused to comply or to answer any
questions about receiving money from the suspects. The government's
motion to compel testimony and to produce evidence was granted and Genson
was held in contempt for refusing to comply with the subpoena or the court's
order. Genson appealed the contempt citation and based his refusal to comply
on the attorney-client privilege and his client's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
The three judge panel unanimously agreed that the contempt citation
should be affirmed but could not agree on the reasons for this result. 5 For this
reason, Judge Pell's opinion considered all the issues before the court6 while
the concurring opinion of Judges Bauer and Tone, which represents the
8
majority opinion,7 only found it necessary to consider one of these issues.
Because the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Fisherv.
United States,' raises further questions about the fifth amendment testimonial
privilege and the attorney-client privilege, this article will consider all of the
issues raised in Genson.
The first question raised was whether Genson, an attorney, had standing
to assert his client's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 10 It
4. The text of the subpoena as given in the opinion reads as follows: -[a]ny and all monies
paid or delivered to you or into your care, custody, and control by Paul Bijeol or Sharon K.
Holloway, .... or their agents, subsequent to 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, December 30, 1975." 534
F.2d at 721.
5. Judge Pell decided that although the transferring of the money to Genson was testimonial in nature, Genson did not have standing to assert the client's privilege against selfincrimination. Further, Judge Pell held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the
transfer of the funds and that the refusal to apply this privilege did not violate his client's sixth
amendment right to counsel. Id. at 722-30. Judges Bauer and Tone, however, found the turning
over of the money to be non-testimonial. Id. at 730-31 (Tone and Bauer, J.J., concurring).
6. These issues concerned the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the
attorney-client privilege, and the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 721.
7. Id.
8. Since Judges Bauer and Tone found that money itself is non-testimonial, there was no
need to consider the other issues. Id. at 731. See note 6 supra.
9. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
10. 534 F.2d at 724.
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was Judge Pell's opinion that whatever fifth amendment privilege adhered to
the client, this privilege did not encompass production or disclosure by the
attorney. " This view is in accord with the clear direction of the United States
2
Supreme Court for more than half a century.'
In Hale v. Henkel,1 3 Hale, the secretary-treasurer of a corporation, was
ordered by the grand jury to appear and produce certain documentary
evidence regarding antitrust litigation then pending against the corporation.
Hale refused to answer on the ground that to do so would incriminate the
corporation. The Court rejected this defense and held that:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to
incriminate himself is a purely personal privilege of the witness. It
was never intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third
person might be incriminatedby his testimony, even though he were
the agent of such person. "
The trend evident in the cases following Hale15 is that the privilege is
limited to the person whose private records are being subpoenaed and that the
privilege does not extend to any other person who has the records in his
possession. 16 Therefore, the only remaining question is whether the relationship of attorney-client is so unique as to create an exception to those cases
which hold that the privilege is a purely personal one. The relationship of
attorney-client was found sufficiently unique in United States v. Judson. 17
There the Internal Revenue Service subpoenaed all of a taxpayer's documents
in his attorney's possession which related to the taxpayer's liability. The
attorney objected on the ground that surrender of the documents might
incriminate his client. The Ninth Circuit first distinguished Hale as simply
11. Id. at 727.
12. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
15. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (the Court held that neither a partnership
nor the individual partners are shielded from compelled production of partnership records on
self-incrimination grounds); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (a client's fifth
amendment rights were held not violated by the issuance of a summons to the client's accountant
to produce records in the accountant's possession).
16. 417 U.S. at 87-101; 409 U.S. at 327-36.
17. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). Other cases which also held that the attorney had standing
to raise the client's fifth amendment privilege are: United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir.
1974); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963);
Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); Application of
House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
However, Kasmir was decided by the United States Supreme Court in the same opinion as
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The Ninth Circuit also seems to have departed from
its own holding in Judson in In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,421 U.S. 978
(1975). Most of the cases follow the view expresseAtn Genson that the attorney has no standing to
raise the client's privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328
F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964), and the cases collected in Lay, Attorney's
Assertion of His Client's PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination in Criminal Tax Investigations, 21
U. MIAMI L. REV. 854 (1967).
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holding that a corporation could not invoke the fifth amendment and then
proceeded to view as unsatisfactory a number of alternatives available to a
18
client if his attorney could not claim the privilege against self-incrimination.
First, the client could choose to withhold all potentially incriminating
evidence from his attorney. This would, however, significantly decrease the
effectiveness of the attorney's representation. Second, the client could deliver
the documents to the attorney and then remain in the presence of the attorney
whenever the attorney used them. This would be necessary in order to
preserve the client's possessory rights over the documents and to retain the
client's fifth amendment rights regarding the evidence. Finally, the client
could deliver possession, exert no effort to remain in control of the documents
and thus lose his privilege against producing them. This court could not
accept the anomaly that "the taxpayer walked into his attorney's office
unquestionably shielded with the Amendment's protection and walked out
with something less. .

.,,I

By also holding that the relationship of

attorney-client superceded a mere agent-principal relationship, the court
determined that an attorney could, in some circumstances, invoke his client's
20
privilege against self-incrimination.
Judge Pell rejected the Judson line of cases and found that any rule
subsequently adopted in tax fraud cases would be inapplicable to the facts of
Genson when he stated that:
The recognition that an attorney need not produce stolen monies in
response to a subpoena would provide a mechanism by which a
member of a learned profession could become the privileged repository of the fruits of a violent crime. There is no reason for
thinking that the policy of respecting
the private enclave of indi2
vidual citizens reaches that far. '
Judge Pell's view regarding the question of standing has been specifically
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in the subsequently decided case
of Fisher v. United States 22
In Fisher, the Internal Revenue Service subpoenaed from Fisher's
attorney records pertaining to Fisher's tax returns. The Court affirmed the
23
Third Circuit's refusal to quash the subpoena on fifth amendment grounds
and reaffirmed the cases which held that the privilege against selfincrimination is an intensely personal privilege which can be claimed only by
24
the person who holds the privilege.
18. 322 F.2d at 463, 466-68.
19. Id. at 466.

20. Id.at 467.
21. 534 F.2d at 727.
22. 425 U.S. 391, 394-96 (1976).
23. As mentioned in note 17 supra, the Court also reversed United States v. Kasmir, 499
F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974). Kasmir had relied heavily upon Judson which quashed a subpoena in a
similar case. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
24. 425 U.S. at 396-97.
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Fisher had claimed that a taxpayer had a legitimate expectation of
privacy for the records in his attorney's hands. The Court, however, responded by noting that not every invasion of privacy violated the fifth
amendment and held that only those invasions where the taxpayer was
compelled to turn over records which would incriminate him were protected. 2 5 Since the fifth amendment, which protects a citizen from being a
compulsory witness against himself, protects the taxpayer's records only
while they are in his possession, the Court found that there was no compulsion
directed against this citizen because the records were in a third party's
hands. 26 Thus, any compulsion caused by the subpoena would be directed not
to the taxpayer but to the attorney.
While Fisher has set to rest any lingering doubts about the personal
nature of the privilege against self-incrimination, and the question of who has
standing to assert it, 27 the policy issue raised by Judson still persists. 28 The
major problem is that a client can enter his attorney's office covered with the
privilege against self-incrimination and exit without it, simply because he
sought the advice of that person necessary to represent his interests in the
judicial process. Fisher's answer was that while the fifth amendment no
longer protected the client, the attorney-client privilege did. 29 Although the
attorney in Fisherhad not explicitly raised the question of the attorney-client
privilege, the Court construed his argument as though he had.
Since the policy basis of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage
clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys, 30 communications made by
the client to the attorney in confidence, for purposes of obtaining legal
assistance, are traditionally protected against compulsory disclosure. 31 However, because the privilege has the effect of keeping out relevant testimony, it
25. Id. at 397. The Court noted that one of the purposes served by the fifth amendment is
protection of privacy. However, this protection of privacy is limited to those cases covered by
the amendment, i.e., those cases involving testimonial self-incrimination. The Court stated it as
follows:
If the Fifth Amendment protected generally against the obtaining of private information from a man's mouth, or pen, or house, its protections would presumably not be
lifted by probable cause and a warrant or by immunity. The privacy invasion is not
mitigated by immunity; and the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's are
not removed by showing reasonableness. The Framers addressed the subject of
personal privacy directly in the Fourth Amendment. . . . They did not seek in still
another Amendment-the Fifth-to achieve a general protection of privacy but to deal
with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination.
Id. at 400. Thus, private incriminating conversations are admissible so long as they are not
compelled. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. 425 U.S. at 397-99.
27. Thus, Fisher confirmed Judge Pell's rejection of any other notion.
28. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
29. 425 U.S. at 402-05.
30. Id. at 403.
31. C. MCCORMICK, TEXT ON EVIDENCE 175 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
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has been strictly limited to those areas necessary to achieve its purpose. 32
Thus, statements that are not made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
are not privileged.3 3 Therefore, all courts have held that if a document might
be obtained from the client, it may be obtained from the attorney 34 and that a
client cannot make a pre-existing document privileged simply by sending it to
his attorney.

35

The converse of the rule that a document can be obtained from the
attorney, if it can be obtained from the client, was specifically approved in
Fisher.36 In so doing, the court endorsed Wigmore's dictum that "when the
client himself [is]. . .privileged from production of the document either as
a party at common law . . .or as exempt from self-incrimination, the

37
attorney having possession of the document is not bound to produce."
Thus, the policy question raised by the Ninth Circuit in Judson was
answered in Fisher. While both the Ninth Circuit and the United States
Supreme Court agree about the result, the striking difference is the means by
which that result is obtained. According to Fisher, it may not be obtained by
raising the fifth amendment but only by invoking the attorney-client
privilege.
This aspect of Fisher, however, differs from Judge Pell's opinion in
Genson. Judge Pell assumed in the second part of the opinion that the client
would be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination because the
production of the money would be a testimonial disclosure. 38 In the third part
of the opinion, he found that the money was not a confidential communication
protected by the attorney-client privilege. 39 Thus, as the Court so aptly stated
in Judson, the client does walk out of the attorney's office with less than when
he walked in.
This seems at odds with Fisher because under Fisherthe production of
the money could not be compelled from the attorney if it could not be
compelled from the client by subpoena. The essence of Fisher, however, is
that the protections afforded a client do not decrease through consultation
with his attorney even though they may vary. Thus, the determination of the
fifth amendment privilege and the attorney-client privilege is coterminous. In
other words, if the court finds that the client was protected by the privilege
32.
33.
Hughes
34.
35.
36.
37.
rev. ed.
38.
39.

Id. at 182.
See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482
v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky.
MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at
Id.
425 U.S. at 404-05.
Id. at 404 (original emphasis). 8
1961).
534 F.2d at 723.
Id. at 727-29.

F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973);
1970).
185.
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307, at 592 (J. McNaughton
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against self-incrimination while the material was in his possession, the court
must also conclude that the material is protected by the attorney-client
privilege while in the hands of the attorney.
The crucial aspect in the analysis, therefore, is the question which
divided Judge Pell from the remainder of the panel; namely, whether the
money delivered to Genson, either for safekeeping or as a fee, was produceable in the hands of Genson's client? 40 Throughout the course of this century,
the United States Supreme Court has developed the notion that the privilege
against self-incrimination applies only to incriminating testimonial communications. Thus, the Court has refused to expand the privilege to the giving of
blood samples,41 handwriting exemplars,4 2 and voice exemplars,4 3 or to the
donning of clothing.'
Fisher held that the material asked for was neither incriminating nor
testimonial.4 5 In that case, the subpoena was directed to an accountant's work
papers used in preparing his client's income tax return. The Court found that
the fact that the papers might be incriminating was not sufficient .46 Since they
were prepared by the accountant, not the taxpayer, and contained no declarations by the taxpayer, they could not be considered incriminating statements
of the taxpayer. Since the preparation of the papers was voluntary, they also
could not be considered compelled by anyone. Thus, in the Court's opinion,
the production of the papers was not compelled and the papers were not
self-incriminating. 47
It was alleged by appellant that compliance with the subpoena would be a
testimonial statement because it would communicate an admission that these
were the papers requested. The Court, however, doubted that this was an
incriminating testimonial statement because the papers were prepared by the
accountant and-because the client's production of them would not admit their
accuracy and truthfulness .48 Thus, the client was only admitting that he had
the papers. The Court found that such an admission was not an incriminating
testimonial statement because the papers themselves violated no law. 4 9 Thus,
40. Or as the court has phrased it, is the transmission of the money a testimonial
communication? Id. at 723. The term "testimonial" is generally thought to include not only
spoken words, but any conduct intended by the actor to communicate to another. MCCORMICK,
supra note 3 1, at 264. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) ("A 'statement' is (I) an oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion.")
41. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
42. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
43. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
44. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
45. 425 U.S. at 409-11.
46. Id. at 409.
47. Id. at 411-13.
48. Id. at 412-13.
49. Id. at 411.
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in complying with this subpoena, the taxpayer was merely expressing his
belief that the papers produced were required and was not authenticating their
genuineness 50° For this reason the attorney in Fisher had to produce the
papers because the client had no fifth amendment right to conceal the
subpoenaed papers and therefore the papers were produceable in the client's
51
hands.
Thus, in order to determine whether the material subpoenaed violates the
fifth amendment, three tests must be met. First, the papers or articles must be
compelled. Second, the papers or articles must be incriminating. This test is
further refined so that the effects must incriminate the person who currently
possesses them. Thus, if the papers or articles were prepared by a third party,
their possession could only be incriminating to the possessor if their possession were illegal. Third, the papers or articles must be testimonial. The effects
must contain some communication which would tend to incriminate their
possessor.
In Genson, Judge Pell split with the rest of the panel on the question of
whether transmission of the money was testimonial. 2 If, however, the tests
derived from Fisher are applied to Genson, it appears that Judge Tone was
correct that possession of the money would not be privileged in the hands of
the client. 5 3 The first test is met because there is no doubt that a subpoena
compels a response.
With regard to the second test, however, it is unclear whether possession
of the money is incriminating within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
Resolution of this question depends heavily upon the wording of the subpoena.5 4 If the subpoena requires production of monies illegally obtained
from a bank, the response certainly would be incriminating. However, if the
subpoena merely asks for all monies received on a certain date, as did the
subpoena in Genson, the response might not be incriminating because the
production of all monies received would not imply that any of the money had
been illegally obtained.
The determination of whether compliance with a subpoena involves
incrimination is intertwined with the third test; namely, whether production
of the money is a testimonial assertion. Again, the wording of the subpoena
may be crucial. While the mere production of money does not imply any
statement about that money, the production of certain monies may imply a
statement. Thus, a testimonial assertion occurs if possession of the effects
50. In fact, in Fisher the taxpayer could not authenticate their genuineness because the
records had been made by the accountant. Id. at 412-13.
51. Id. at 414.
52. 534 F.2d at 723.
53. Id. at 731.
54. See note 4 supra.
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asked for by the subpoena either is illegal or is equivalent to a statement of
participation in an illegal activity.
If the subpoena had been directed to Genson's client, he probably would
have had to comply because it would not have been incriminating to admit that
he had received money on that day and because production of such money
would not be an assertion pertinent to anything other than the fact that he had
received money on that day. If, however, the subpoena had requested money
received from the bank, production would be incriminating because the
testimonial assertion would be that the person subpoenaed possessed the
money from the bank and such a possession is illegal. Thus, Judge Tone is
correct in his finding that the money was non-testimonial." Indeed, the Tone
opinion begins at the proper point of analysis. The entire case turns on the
question of whether that which the subpoena requested infringed the suspect's
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. If it did not,
then that is the end of the case. If it did, then the related problem of the
attorney-client privilege arises. However, according to Fisher, the attorneyclient privilege ought to apply to all documents protected by the fifth
amendment.56
FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF BIAS

United States v. Marzano57 addressed a problem not specifically covered in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The issue was whether it is necessary,
when attempting to impeach a witness by showing bias contained in his prior
statement, to lay a foundation before introducing extrinsic evidence of this
bias. In upholding the trial court's refusal to allow the introduction of this
extrinsic evidence, the Seventh Circuit held that" [w]here bias is to be proved
55. 534 F.2d at 731.
56. Fisher, however, left open several questions:
(1) The Court specifically refused to discuss whether the taxpayer's papers sent to the
accountant would be protected by the privilege in the taxpayer's hands. Thus, the assumption
that a person's private records cannot be subpoenaed now appears in doubt.
(2) An additional question raised by Fisherconcerns the underpinnings of the attorneyclient privilege. Because the attorney-client privilege is basically a creature of the common law
and because the details of the privilege have evolved in different ways in different states, the
body of law concerning the scope of the privilege and those people protected by the privilege is
not completely uniform. (MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 175-211). Under Fisher the attorneyclient privilege is applicable to all cases where the client is privileged against production. 425 U.S.
at 403-05. However, because of the manner in which the common law of attorney-client privilege
has developed in the various jurisdictions, this result does not necessarily follow.
(3) The final question then is whether Fisheris binding on the states. There is no indication
in Fisher that the part of the decision which concerns the attorney-client relationship is of
constitutional dimensions. If it is, then it is binding on the states. If it is not, then a state court
could hold that a person loses his privilege against self-incrimination when he turns a paper over
to his attorney and that the state attorney-client privilege does not protect against that paper's
disclosure.
57. 537 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1976).
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by showing a prior statement, a foundation must be laid by calling the
statement to the witness' attention so that the witness may explain or deny the
statement." 5 8 Since the defendant in Marzano failed to confront the witness
with his prior statement during cross-examination, the court held that the
59
defendant could not introduce extrinsic evidence of the statement.
The defendant here stole over $3,000,000 from Purolator Security,
Inc. 's vaults and was convicted of conspiracy, taking money belonging to a
federally insured bank, and transporting stolen money in interstate commerce. The defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court judge
improperly precluded him from introducing testimony which would show that
a witness was biased.
Impeachment of a witness by bias is one of several evidentiary points not
addressed in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 60 However, one should not
assume that by such ommission Congress intended to eliminate bias as a
method of impeachment. Bias has a long and honored history as a major
method of impeachment. 61 In some instances it even seems as though courts
favor bias evidence. 62 The probative value of evidence offered to show bias
normally is lower than the probative value required for admission of substantive evidence. 63 Thus, evidence which is inadmissible for other purposes may
64
be admitted if the evidence tends to show bias on the part of the witness.
Another reason for the liberal approach toward extrinsic evidence of bias is
that in criminal cases it is possible that the exclusion of evidence showing the
bias of government witnesses could deprive a defendant of his sixth amendment right to confrontation. 65 Most commentators suggest that bias is
implicitly covered in rule 607 because that rule provides that any party may
attack the credibility of any witness 66 Thus, it is suggested that the absence of
58. Id. at 265.
59. Id. at 266-69.
60. See K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 407-14, which
discusses the necessity of reference to and reliance upon common law rules and principles of
evidence in conjunction with use of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
61. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 943-69 (J.Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
62. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 607[03], at 607-17 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN].
63. E.g., State v. Cadena, 9 Ariz. App. 369, 452 P.2d 534 (1969).
64. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Reynolds Well Serv., Inc., 234 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950),
where the court held that proof that a witness was the insurance agent of one of the parties was
admissible to show the bias of the witness, even though normally the subject of insurance may not
be mentioned. This is explicitly confirmed by FED. R. EVID. 411. The same approach is used in
offers of compromise. FED. R. EVID. 408.
65. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974). The sixth amendment, in pertinent part,
reads as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be
confronted with the witnesses against him ..
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
66. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, at 607-17. Rule 607, in pertinent part, reads as
follows: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
him." FED. R. EVID. 607.
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any language excluding bias tacitly approves it. 67
Because there is no legislative history on bias in general, there also is no
guidance on the subsidiary question of whether a foundation is necessary to
introduce extrinsic evidence of bias. The only indication in the Federal Rules
of Evidence is contained in rule 613(b) which requires a foundation in order to
introduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. 68 The Seventh
Circuit in Marzano also noted that the rationale for rule 613(b) seemed
applicable to situations where bias is to be proved by showing a prior
statement.69

The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence noted that
rule 613(b) continued the foundation requirement but relaxed the method of
laying the foundation. 70 Instead of the traditional requirement that the
witness' attention must be directed to the prior inconsistent statement on
cross-examination, 7 1 under rule 613(b) the witness must merely be given an
opportunity to explain the prior inconsistent statement and the opposite party
must be afforded an opportunity to examine the witness about the statement. 72
The traditional reason for requiring a foundation when impeaching by prior
inconsistent statement has been to prevent unfair surprise to the witness, to
allow the witness to explain the discrepancy, and to save time. 73 It would
seem that these reasons should also apply to prior statements being used to
show bias. 74 However, rule 613(b) also indicates that these objectives can be
achieved through a flexible approach whereby the trial judge exercises his
75
considerable discretion.
While state courts have not entirely agreed that a foundation is necessary
to show bias,76 the federal courts before enactment of the Federal Rules of
67. Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
239 (1967); Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses, Common Law Principlesand Modern Trends, 34
IND. L.J. 1(1958); Hale, Bias Affecting Credibility, I HASTINGS L.J. 1(1949); Hale, Impeachment
of Witnesses by Prior Inconsistent Statements, 10 S. CAL. L. REv. 135 (1937).
68. Rule 613(b), in pertinent part, reads as follows: "Extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him
thereon, or the interest of justice otherwise require." FED. R. EvID. 613(b).
69. 537 F.2d at 265.
70. WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, at 613-14, provides the Advisory Committee Comment on
FED. R. EVID. 613.
71. WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, at 613-14.
72. See note 68 supra.
73. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 72.
74. Id. at 80.
75. See note 68 supra. An example of this discretion is probably the court's power to
control the order of proof under FED. R. EvID. 61 l(a). See WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, 607[03], at
607-33.
76. Compare State v. Shaw, 93 Ariz. 40, 378 P.2d 487 (1963) (foundation required) with
Kidd v. People, 97 Colo. 480, 51 P.2d 1020 (1935) (no foundation required).
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Evidence had generally required that a foundation must be laid.77 While there
78
has been some suggestion that the federal courts were split on this question,
the Seventh Circuit accurately noted that most of the cases not requiring a
foundation were clearly distinguishable because those cases usually held that
a foundation was unnecessary when the proof of bias was by past conduct
what it
rather than by past statement . 79 Thus, the Seventh Circuit adopted
80
thought was the clearly prevailing federal view on the question.
The court, however, did not consider whether a foundation would be
necessary if the impeachment by bias was through conduct instead of by 82a
prior statement. 8 1 Many jurisdictions and rule 613(b) accept this distinction
because evidence of conduct is not thought to involve elements of surprise to
the witness. 8 3 Nevertheless, it could be argued that there is a greater need to
explain conduct than there is to explain prior statements. It is probably
inadvisable for the court to adopt any strict rule distinguishing between
conduct and prior statements. As McCormick correctly points out: "words
and conduct are usually intermingled in proof of bias, and 'nice and subtle
distinctions' should be avoided in shaping this rule of trial practice.'" 84
Indeed, the better view in this situation is not to have any rule at all. It
seems that the policy considerations of unfair surprise, explanation by the
witness, and savings of time should be well within the discretion of the trial
court. Requiring a foundation where a statement is involved will not always
guarantee that those policy considerations will be advanced. Conversely,
there may be occasions when those factors would indicate that some foundation should be required even though conduct, prior statement or both is
involved. Indeed, the commentators are probably correct when they intimate
that the entire question should be left to the trial court judge's discretion based
on the above factors. 85 It seems that this could be assumed under rule 611 (a)
77. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982(1973); Smith v.
United States, 283 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 847 (1961).
78. Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 407, 427 (1963).
79. 537 F.2d at 265. The most commonly cited case for the proposition that no foundation is
necessary is Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 776
(1943). However, the discussion there is clearly dicta as the proper foundation questions had
indeed been asked. The same is true of Greatreaks v. United States, 211 F.2d 674(9th Cir. 1954).
In other cases, e.g., Comer v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 323 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1963), the bias was
contained in prior conduct as opposed to a prior statement. The position of the federal courts is
more accurately set out in United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
982 (1973), and Smith v. United States, 283 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 847
(1961), which require a foundation.
80. 537 F.2d at 265.
81. Id.
82. Id. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, at 613-14, which provides the Advisory Committee
Comment on FED. R. EviD. 613. The Advisory Committee's comment to that rule expressly notes
that it does not apply to evidence of prior inconsistent conduct.
83. MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 75.
84. Id. at 80.
85. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, 607[03], at 607-33.
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and perhaps that is the reason why there is no specific section in the Federal
Rules of Evidence on the role of a foundation in bias cases.
PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED

In United States v. Senak, 6 the Seventh Circuit approved the admission
into evidence of a witness' statement which had been written down three years
after the event in question. The court held it was admissible as a past
recollection recorded. 87 Senak, a pauper's attorney, was charged with using
his position to extract money from persons he had been appointed to
represent. At the trial, the government presented a witness who testified about
the conversations which she could remember having with the defendant.
After an attempt to refresh her recollection about other conversations failed,
the prosecution introduced substantively a statement taken from her by the
government three years after the conversations had taken place. The witness
testified that she believed that the statement was accurate when taken.
By affirming the admissibility of the statement,8 8 the court further
illustrated that discretion is one of the major modern trends in the law of
hearsay. While discretion has become the hallmark of the law of evidence in
many areas,8 9 the rule against hearsay had been thought to be impervious to
9 However, in recent years it has become clear that trial court judges are
it.
exercising their discretion to admit hearsay testimony when it is pertinent to
the case. 91 Indeed, one recent commentator remarked that this trend had
become so predominant that "there are few cases today where the outcome of
a well-tried case would have been different had it not been for the hearsay
rule, where a good court was prevented from admitting persuasive
hearsay. "

92

The Federal Rules of Evidence have rendered explicit what had been
93
implicit. Although the hearsay sections of the Federal Rules of Evidence
restate the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule, they also contain an open
ended provision for admitting other trustworthy statements. 94 Rule 803(5) 95
86. 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
87. Id. at 138.
88. Id. at 142.
89.

MCCORMICK, supra note 31, at 755-56.

90. Id.
91. Id.at 755.
92.

Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOwA L. REV. 331, 343 (1961).

93. FED. R. EVID. 801-806.
94. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) which provide for admissibility of
statements not specifically covered by the other exceptions if certain requirements are met.
95. Rule 803(5), in pertinent part, reads as follows:
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and
accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was
fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly.
FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
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illustrates how this process has affected records of past recollection. The
common law exception, among other requirements, permitted past recollection recorded only when it was made at or near the time of the event that the
person was writing about. 96 This requirement was designed to assure that the
event was recorded before the witness began to forget the details of the
occurrence. 9' However, as the words "at or near the time" began to take on a
significance of their own, some courts began to exclude some written
recollections based upon a time gap alone.9 Also, other courts began to
recognize that some events remain fresh in the memory for a long time while
others fade more quickly. 99 These variations indicate that there should not be
a rigid time requirement applicable to all instances of past recollection
recorded.
This approach has been adopted in rule 803(5). This rule substitutes for
the "at or near the time" standard, a broader standard of "when the matter
was fresh in his memory." 100 Thus, it is clear that the trial judge now has the
discretion to decide whether, from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
a particular memorandum was made when the matter was fresh in the
declarant's memory.
In Senak, the court used this discretionary approach to approve the
admissibility of a writing as past recollection recorded that clearly would not
have been admitted under the traditional formulation of the rule. Under the
common law, this gap of three years from the event to the writing would have
been fatal. Now the question of time is just one factor the trial judge should
take into account in determining admissibility instead of being the sole
determining factor. Other factors which the trial judge might take into
consideration are the quality of the memory embodied in the recording, the
nature of the event, and whether the recording was in response to questions
asked by an interested party. 10 1 In Senak, all these factors were taken into
account. There the information was elicited by the government, clearly an
interested party. However, the court also felt that the asking for money by an
attorney appointed to handle a case without a fee was an event which would
lodge itself in the mind of the person questioned. The court also noted that the
quality of recollection contained in the recording seemed to be high because
the declarant had read through the statement and had struck out several
inaccurate portions. In considering all the circumstances involved in the
%.
97.

MCCORMICK,

supra note 31, at 712.

Id. at 714.
98. See, e.g., Gigliotti v. United Illuminating Co., 151 Conn. 114, 193 A.2d 718 (1963)
(statement recorded six weeks after the event).
99. See cases cited in 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 745, at 94-96 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
100. See note 95 supra.
101. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, 803(5)[01], at 803-137.
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making of the memorandum, the court could not hold that the trial judge had
102
abused his discretion in admitting the document.
The methodology of Senak probably represents the future direction of
hearsay cases. Instead of fairly rigid rules, the trial judge will determine, in
his discretion, whether the basis of any particular hearsay exception is
satisfied. Thus, the role of the appellate tribunal will correspondingly be
reduced to determining whether the judge abused his discretion. This will
result in a deepening of the trend to confine evidentiary questions to the trial
level. Therefore, the appellate court will only occasionally find that a trial
judge was incorrect on an evidentiary point and this will probably only occur
103
in criminal cases tried by a jury.
CONCLUSION

Thus, we have seen three cases in which the Seventh Circuit has
furthered modern trends in the law of evidence and filled gaps in the new rules
in accordance with those trends. In Genson we saw that the United States
Constitution may require close examination of the nature of various types of
evidence and privileges. It must be observed that under the facts of this case
this examination resulted in the determination that the evidence sought was
not protected and the privilege asserted was unavailable, which is in line with
the general trend toward greater admissibility and fewer privileges in other
areas of the law of evidence.
At first glance it might seem that the result in Marzano is contrary to the
modern trend. If viewed, however, not as upholding an exclusion but as
upholding the discretion of the trial court, it can be seen that Marzano is in
fact consistent with the modern trend. By leaving the matter in the hands of
the trial judge, the ultimate effect will probably be greater admissibility in the
long run.
Senak clearly demonstrates the movement toward greater admissibility
and, through its emphasis on discretion, greater liberalization of the rules of
evidence.

102.
103.

527 F.2d at 142.
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supra note 31, at 755.

